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The problem of commanding and controlling armed forces,
and of instituting effective communications with and
within them, is as old as war itself. [Ref. 1]
Martin Van Creveld, in his book Command in War specifi-
cally treated the problems that are related to the C 3 I system,
particularly those problems related to decision-making,
communication and the central issue of how a commander may
cope with uncertainty.
Although the problem of command and control is not new,
its evolution has been exponential in modern times, especially
since World War II. The growth is due to several factors:
[Ref. 1: p. 1-4]
1
.
The increased demands made on command and control systems
is due to the greatly enhanced complexity, mobility, and
dispersion of modern armed forces.
2. Technological developments that have multiplied the tools
at the disposal of command and control systems, especially
in the field of communications and data processing technolo-
gy.
3. Changes in the nature of the command and control process,
resulting from the interactions of factors 1 and 2 mentioned
above, that have led to an explosion in data processed by
any given command and control system to carry out any given
mission.
4. An increase in the command and control systems' vulnera-
bility, due to the increment of their electronic emissions
that make them prime targets, and the appearance of new and
more accurate weapons systems that use those electronic
emissions for guidance.
It is known that the needs for command and control systems
arise from the size, complexity, and different components of
an army, and it also varies according to the relation between
those factors. In others words, the command and control
systems increase in scope with the sophistication of the
forces. [Ref. 1: p. 6]
Precisely because the complexity of armed forces and the
multiple missions that they must do, make complete
coordination more important than ever, and owing to the
unprecedented range of gadgets at its disposal, the role
that command may play in determining the outcome of
present-day military conflict is crucial. By making
possible a faster, clearer reading of the situation and
more effective distribution or resources, a superior
command and control system may serve as a force multiplier
and compensate for weaknesses in other fields, such as
numerical inferiority
.
[Ref . 1: p. 4]
The solution to the problems mentioned above can be
treated using two different approaches: one is the technologi-
cal approach, and another one is the human or organizational
approach. The success of a solution will depend on the degree
to which each of these approaches complement the other.
Although it will not be treated in extended detail in this
study, the organizational approach should be kept in mind
while reading this thesis because the human being is not just
a component of the C 3 I systems. He is an integral part of the
C 2 process itself, in both sides of any conflict, friend and
foe, and he becomes a major source of the complexity of the
C 3 I systems
.
While the purpose of any command and control system is to
support the commander (decision-maker) , it is also important
to remember that the human mind provides the most effective
command and control system found in nature, and its internal
functions have been used to develop models for actual struc-
tures and processes of the command and control systems
.
[Ref. 2]
The integration and interoperability of the C 3 I systems
have been shown to be main issues in the technological
approach as a way to reduce the uncertainty of the war.
The manner in which the technological approach is intended
to be carried out is shown below:
In the executive summary of the July 1987 Defense Science
Board (DSB) report, the first recommendation of the board
stated:
To assure the operational effectiveness of the systems for
the support of command and control, we recommend that a
strong institutional process be put in place to:
• establish and maintain an architecture for the command and
control of U.S. forces operating under either national or
allied command that links all elements of the command and
control structure from both top down and bottom up;
• establish and maintain the standards needed to achieve
interoperability and operational effectiveness in the
field and enforce adherence thereto;
• provide conceptual guidance and technical support to field
commands as they evolve their command and control systems




Considering the Argentine Army specifically, it can be
seen that the concepts of C 2 were implicit in its doctrine,
but were incorporated as an explicit doctrinal issue only
recently
.
The first steps to design a suitable C 3 I architecture and
C 3 I systems that fit the Argentine Army's needs have already
been taken, but important concepts still remain uncertain.
These concepts could help to improve the design and develop-
ment of those systems.
At the present time the Argentine Army has a considerable
investment in computer and communications equipment that
has been procured and installed without regard to system
integration or interoperability. The SIIFE Project
(Sistema Informatico Integrado de la Fuerza Ejercito) was
the first attempt to organize information processing in
the Argentine Army. [Ref . 4]
Subsequent projects attempted to continue the original
SIIFE project, but for several reasons they did not reach
their integrative objectives. Those projects targeted primari-
ly the Fire Control Systems and Logistic Systems, but they
suffered from a lack of understanding of interoperability
issues and isolated their focus on development, disregarding
the impact on other interrelated programs
.
B . PURPOSE
With the constant incorporation of new technology in
military operations through new systems or modernization of
old systems, the importance of integration and interoperabil-
ity becomes more relevant as a means to improve the effective-
ness of the systems and to provide the Commander with more
accurate and timely information.
As the C 3 I concepts mature in the Argentine Army by their
being included in its doctrine and by developing a C 3 I
architecture, the requirements for integration and interopera-
bility will increase extraordinarily.
In view of these requirements, the purpose of this thesis
is to identify, and analyze the up-to-date tools and tech-
niques that can help the development efforts of the Argentine
Army to integrate and make its current and future systems
interoperable
.
This thesis only attempts to be a guide for the introduc-
tion of ideas, models, tools, and techniques related with the
factor that can improve the interoperability of the C 3 I system
of the Argentine Army. It also attempts to be a compendium of
up-to-date information to be used by people who are working in
the management of related fields in the Argentine Army.
C . SCOPE
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the C 3 I system
environment. A plethora of information has been published
regarding C3 I systems, but it is difficult to synthesize the
various concepts of concern.
This study will be limited to exploring the integrative
factors of C 3 I systems. This thesis is not an attempt to cover
the technical information related to each one of the aspects
of interest, but it is meant to provide a general description
and understanding of them and how are they related in a C 3 I
system.
Information about C2 processes and C 3 I system architectures
will be provided to assist the reader in his familiarity and
understanding of the issues.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis consists of eight chapters and it can be
divided in three parts. The first part includes Chapters I to
III and presents the information required to get a basic
understanding of the material to be analyzed. Chapter II will
contain the description of the C2 process and some models used
to represent it. Chapter III will cover the general informa-
tion about C 3 I system architectures and will catalog the main
integrative factors of those systems.
The second part will include Chapters IV to VI . Chapter IV
will address the information handling, integration, and
description of the improved tools available today. Chapter V
will deal with the communication means and will discuss the
communication characteristics as well as analyze mobile
communications in the tactical environment and its contribu-
tion as an integrator. Chapter VI will investigate the
networking role in the C3 I systems, providing reference
models and addressing the internetworking issues also.
The third and last part will consist of Chapters VII and
VIII. These chapters will contain a summary of the study in a
format that proffers applicable recommendations for the
Argentine Army concerning each one of the issues that were
analyzed in the previous chapters
.
II. GENERAL CONCEPTS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
A. INTRODUCTION
The terminology of C 2 , C 3 I, C 4 I, etc., have been used in a
confusing fashion to identify different systems and/or groups
of systems or processes in the Command and Control literature.
The terms were expanded or contracted according to the
perception that a particular group has of C2 . Such is the case
of the communicators who perceive communications as a central
component of C2 and use the term Command, Control and Communi-
cations (C 3 ) / or the computer technicians that perceive the
computer as a key factor in the systems and name them Command,
Control, Communications and Computers (C4 ) , and so on [Ref . 5] .
These different perceptions produce confusion and misuse,
particularly for the average person who does not usually deal
with C3 I literature, and these perceptions become the main
source for the profusion of acronyms in the literature.
If it is desired to produce a methodological approach to
C 2 processes and C 3 I systems, it is necessary to use a correct,
common interpretation of the terms involved; otherwise as in
all other sciences, no theory can be developed and the
community will perpetuate the misunderstandings and arguments
without achieving their particular and general goals. [Ref. 6]
Descartes advised us with the following maxim: "Define the
meaning of words precisely and you will save mankind half of
its confusion" [Ref. 6: p. 4]
1 . C 2 definitions
The official definition of Command and Control given
by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is:
Command and Control: The exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures which are employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the
mission. [Ref . 7]
The different concepts implicit in this definition
will be exposed and analyzed later in this chapter, but two
concepts must be emphasized and distinguished so that they may
be used later.
The concepts are that Command and Control is a
"system" but also a "process". The C2 system is constituted by
all the physical components and structures that allow C2 to be
performed. On the other hand, the C2 process is the intrinsic
part that is concerned with how C2 is performed. The function-
ality of the C 2 system is the C2 process [Ref. 8] .
The definition given by Robert E. Conley is clear
enough to easily understand the point:
Command and Control (C 2 ) is a process of resource alloca-
tion (management) by a knowledgeable, recognized point of
authority to accomplish a given objective (s)
.
[Ref . 4: p.
5].
2 . C 3 and C 3 I definitions
Another important term in need of a clear definition
is the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C 3 I)
system, because it is the most widely used acronym related to
the foundation of Command and Control.
The extension of the Command and Control definition to
include the term Communications results from the need to make
explicit the physical support of the C 2 process by allowing
the communication of a commander with his forces and support
of the actual relationships among components and subsystems.
The acronym C 3 has gained its own entity, and a clear defini-
tion is beginning to appear in the literature. Examples are
the definition of C3 given by Dr Gerald P. Dineen (Former
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3 I) , USA) :
The C3 systems of the DOD are the means by which our
military commanders, under the direction of the president
as the commander-in-chief, employ the military strength of
our nation. Reliable communications, information process-
ing, surveillance and warning, electronic warfare and
counter-C3 are essential for effective C3
.
[Ref . 9]
Also consider the brief definition provide by Kenneth
L. Moll:
The command, control and communications system is a
collection of elements which display the properties of the
command and control process
.
[Ref . 5: p. 25]
The incorporation of the term Intelligence into the
definition represents the commander's information needs with
regards to the enemy situation, and the interaction of these
needs with the Command and Control process.
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B. C2 AND C3I PROCESS MODEL
Several criteria have been used to develop C 2 process
conceptual models. The model must be simple, must represent
the essential C 2 functions, must be understood by the comman-
der, and must be measurable and complete. The model is measur-
able and complete if the C 2 process itself is described in
terms of few functional components, and satisfies principles
and theories advanced by other writers
.
Command systems consist of organizations, procedures, and
technical means; command itself is a process that goes on
within the system, and makes use of information in order
to coordinate people and things toward the accomplishment
of their missions. [Ref . 1: p. 262]
Each definition presented so far has emphasized in
different ways such concepts as planning, direction, coordina-
tion, control, and commander, so they may be considered key
issues in the Command and Control process.
1. Lawson's conceptual models
Dr Joel S. Lawson, Jr., from the Naval Electronic
Systems Command, in his report entitled "The State Variables
of a Command Control System" presented the conceptualization
of C 2 as a cybernetic process [Ref. 10] . The details
of Lawson's model for C2 process are shown in Figure 1. [Ref.
2: p. 24]
In his initial conceptualization and subsequent
refinement, Lawson identifies five basic functions with their
interfaces to the environment. The SENSING function has
11
responsibility for gathering data from the environment. The
PROCESS function accounts for the extraction of meaning from
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J
Figure 1. Simple C 2 process model
compares the state of the environment with a desired state.
The DECIDE function acts upon the COMPARE function by deciding
what should be done to reach the desired state. Finally, the
ACT function executes that decision. [Ref. 2: p. 24-25]
This simple conceptualization was expanded by Lawson
to explicitly include the Intelligence/Analysis process and
its interaction with the C2 process, and to develop the C 3 I















Figure 2. Lawson' s C 3 I process model
Lawson' s conceptualization constituted the starting
point for several C 2 process analyses and models, although
some of Lawson's concepts may be not practical or applicable
anymore
.
In evolving the basic model, there are those who
believe that the simple Lawson model could be expanded to
include more complex analysis of the C 2 process, by "nesting"
as shown in Figure 3 [Ref . 11]
.
Several such control systems could be "nested" to reflect
a military hierarchy of "command", where the environment
of a senior authority includes the environment of a
subordinate authority. The desired state of the subordina-
te's environment is dictated by the actions of the senior.
Participation of several subordinate activities could be
13
reflected, with each of their environments included
(possibly with overlap) , in the environment of the senior
authority. Such a representation could be useful in
highlighting the real need for cooperating elements to
coordinate their actions
.
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Figure 3. System of "nested" C processes
2 . Combat operation process model
This model was presented and analyzed by George E.
Orr, Major USAF, in Research Report No. AU-ARI-82-5, in July
1983.
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Figure 4 represents the basic 0-O-D-A structure
suggested by Col John Boyd. The 0-O-D-A loop is simple, but










Figure 4 . Boyd' s 0-O-D-A loop structure
Figure 5 presents the Conceptual Combat Operation
Process Model presented by Orr. The primary differences
between the Lawson/Boyd models and the Orr model are:
• The inclusion of explicit interfaces to higher and lower
levels
.
• The inclusion of a generic INTELLIGENCE/ANALYSIS block
with extensive connections to other blocks. [Ref. 2: p. 27]
The process is intended to represent the combat













Figure 5. Orr's conceptual combat operation model
hierarchy. The Intelligence/Analysis function is not very
important at the force application level. In this point,
Orr's model is basically identical to Boyd's model with the
Sense and Observe functions related together. Boyd's Orient
function is a merging and identification of the Process and
Intelligence/Analysis in Orr's model. The Decide function and
Act function are the same in both models and in Lawson' s model
as well.
At higher levels in the hierarchy, Orr's model
approximates Lawson' s model in the sense that it interprets
16
the Intelligence/Analysis function as a function that starts
to operate separately
.
[Ref. 2: p. 27]
3 . A reference model
A practical model, "Command and control: Reference
model" (C 2RM) , is under evolutionary research and development
under the sponsorship of the Joint Directors of Laboratories
(JDL) , Technical Panel for C3 (TPC3) , Basic Research Group
(BRG) . This model intends to provide a framework for research
and development of Command and Control for many of the same or
analogous reasons which motivated the evolution of the
International Standards Organization (ISO) Open System Inter-
connection (OSI) Reference Model for communications.
[Ref. 12]
Such a model will be used as a reference and will be
described in general in the following chapters, especially
where the interoperability and networking issues require so.
Figure 6 shows the general structure of the C 2 para-
digms presented by the C 2RM.
It is the goal of C2RM to provide the framework of choice
to guide the development of a consistent set of standards
and specifications for interoperability and to offer
substantial protection of extensive investments in
acquisitions by promoting modular reusable technologies.
The advantage of this model is that it has the flexibility
to incorporate many features of existing paradigms and to
accommodate a wide variety of perspectives while promoting
a greater common understanding of the levels of interope-






































Figure 6. The general structure of C2 paradigms
Figure 6(a) represents the Main Cycle with Feed-
forward. Figure 6(b) shows the Main Cycle with Feedback, and
Figure 6(c) explains the distributed, nested, layered,
coordinated and hierarchical Main Cycle. Each of the blocks
represents a complex, collective and compound process.
The common denominator of all C 2 paradigms can be shown to
be decision theoretic in nature. To each system-level
Observation there corresponds a system- level Action. A
system-level Decision is invoked to select a system-level
Action for a given system-level Observation. Sequences of
system-level Observation-Action pairs characterize the
Dynamics, i.e., the rules of behavior and evolution, of
the system-level decision process. This structure and the
associated overall cyclical process, also called C 2
process, is inherent in any C2 paradigm. [Re f. 12: p. 8]
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C. CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS
1 . Model limitations
A detailed description of several other models is
obtainable today, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
include them because these other models would confuse rather
that clarify the basic concepts.
However, it is in the interest of this study to point
out the realistic issues of the process, because weaknesses
appear in the implementation of these idealized diagrams, and
interoperability and integration then become relevant con-
cepts .
While these diagrams are invaluable in helping us under-
stand the C2 process, the abstractions and idealizations
they include are very limiting. . . .Attempts to generalize
the simple cybernetic loop (Figure 1, 2) by introducing
nested and concurrent processes (Figure 3) has led very
rapidly to the Achilles heel of systems engineering: the
curse of dimensionality. . . . By then, the simplicity and
elegance - the strengths - of the cybernetic loop have
been lost.[Ref. 10: p. 2]
The cost of this oversimplification is too high if the
intent of these models is for "real world" applications, where
elements of the environment and the threat are beyond theoret-
ical control and where uncertainty has its reign.
Yet, the models presented above are essential to
progressing with the identification of new weaknesses or key
factors in the Command and Control process and the C3 I systems
which support it.
19
The use of these models will allow the improvement of
the C 2 process and contribute to reaching the mythic goal of
developing a theory of C 2 that could help to get a better
understanding of how to cope with uncertainty in combat.
In the following chapter, this study will attempt to
present some of the "realities" that have to be considered in
the application of those models by analyzing some key factors
for C 3 I systems interoperability.
2 . Focusing C3 I system' s role
C 3 I has two general requirements, information and
action, to accomplish its purpose of observing and providing
warning and assessment of the intentions of adversaries, of
collecting and processing information on the status of
friendly and hostile forces, of supporting operational
planning and decision making, and of communicating commands to
forces. [Ref. 4: p. 7]
Based in the stochastic nature of military operations,
it is possible to analyze the role of the C3 I systems and
their range of application. Uncertainty is everpresent on a
battlefield and combat results are difficult to predict.
Additionally, another school of thought exists, the
deterministic, which believes that the unpredictability of
military operations is caused by a lack of knowledge and by
the lack of techniques to supply that knowledge. Depending on
which school of thought is applied, it will be the role that
20
will be assigned to the C 3 I systems into any organization. If
military operations are fundamentally deterministic, then
placing emphasis on aspects of C 3 I systems which resolve
uncertainty and provide detailed resolution of the battlefield
is justified. But if military operations are fundamentally
stochastic, then emphasis should shift toward aspects that
help in the management of the forces distribution, identifi-
cation of focus of problems, determination of possible
maneuver, and favorable attacking positions.
The separation line is not as clear and simple as de-
scribed above, and the stochastic perspective seems be more
realistic. Nevertheless, C 3 I system improvements can cut down
a great amount of the uncertainty that currently exists in
battle. But no matter how complex and efficient the C 3 I
systems could be, the stochastic nature of the military
operation will emerge again when the C 3 I systems begin to
reach the limits of their resolution. [Ref . 2: pp. 85 - 87]
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has been designed to provide the basic
definitions and concepts relating to C 2 processes and C 3 I
system supports. The material covers different conceptual
models used for the C 2 community. These models present the
relationship among different system components.
21
The evolution of the efforts for modelling the C 2 process,
in order to develop a related theory about C 2 , has also been
described.
"Reality" imposes many constraints that have made impossi-
ble, so far, the consolidation of such a theory, making this
pursuit a permanent challenge, where the C 3 I systems have an
important role to play.
22
III. INTEGRATION IN C3 I SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A. C3 ARCHITECTURES
1 . Overview
An architecture is essentially a interrelated set of
building blocks. It provides a conceptual and general frame-
work to develop systems and interrelations among them, by
internal interfaces and by external interfaces with the
environment
.
An architecture is a framework for design, a framework
which permits isolation of design problems with reasonable
confidence so that if each can be solved separately, the
system as a whole will operate as required [Ref . 13]
.
In the literature, the C3 systems architecture is used
to delineate a theoretical framework, within which individual
design can be performed for different subsets of C 3 systems.
For example, it is possible to find individual references and
separate descriptions of communications, networks, or informa-
tion architectures.
A C3 architecture is comprehensive and acts as an
amalgam for all those subsets, providing a better way to
fulfill the requirements of the C 2 process.
The architecture of a C3 system is the initial stage of
the overall system engineering process. C 3 architecture is
the arrangement of (or process of arranging) the basic
elements of a C 3 system into an orderly system framework.
23
The singular characteristic of a C3 system is that it
describes the interrelationship between selected elements
of the system. The C 3 architecture will be expressed as a
set of assumptions, statements and diagrams describing the
interoperation among the system elements
.
[Ref. 3: pp. 82]
2 . Architecture Visions and Levels
As shown in Figure 7, the C3 architecture can be seen
as a three-faceted pyramid that represents different visions.
The description of the information vision of the C 3 architec-
ture will be addressed in Chapter IV and the description of
the communications vision will be addressed in Chapter V. The
remaining facet is discussed in this section.
The following description of the architecture levels
is a summary of the concepts expressed by Victor J. Monteleon
and Dr. James R. Miller. [Ref. 3: p. 82 - 83]
The C3 systems are not isolated systems, but they are
immersed in a general context. That context can be idealized
for developmental purposes, and it provides a goal for the
system developers. This context also defines the boundaries of
the C3 systems, and levels of the architecture can be speci-
fied depending on the boundaries of the system.
• Processing Architecture: It is defined by the architecture
of the system processing elements.
• Nodal Architecture: It is the architecture of the node
itself. The node can be a facility space, a command, a
platform and also a network. The nodal architecture
provides a blueprint of the relationships of the basic
system elements of the node. One example is that a node
could have a fully distributed architecture, a partially
distributed architecture (such as independent subsystems




Figure 7. C 3 architecture: Vision and levels.
• Network Architecture: It is the relationships of the nodes
to each other and the means by which they are connected to
form larger operational units or networks. In the case of
a command node the integration of a space-related subsys-
tem into the node requires a network architecture for the
overall node. The connection of the nodes in a meaningful
manner to form a larger unit also requires a network
architecture. The characteristics of the network architec-
tures will be addressed in Chapter VI
.
• Global Architecture: It consists of the interconnections
between networks to form global networks. It is, in
essence, an architecture for a network of networks.
INTEROPERABILITY IN TACTICAL C3 ARCHITECTURES
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1 . Interoperability
This study is focusing its research on interopera-
bility aspects of the C 3 I systems, particularly those issues
related to networks, tactical communications, and data
processing systems. These issues will be treated extensively
in the following chapters.
The following definition will prove useful:
Interoperability: the ability to provide services to and
accept services from other systems and to use the services
so exchanged. [Ref. 7: p. 182]
Interoperability is one of the functional criteria
that any military C3 I system should meet to accomplish its two
general requirements of information and action, as described
in Chapter II.
It should be understood that interoperability is not
a simple technical matter; to the contrary it is a complex
subject that results from the combination of several vari-
ables, such as doctrine, procedures, planning, training,
requirements, standards, etc.; and it involves all the levels
of command.
Tactical C3I systems are neither isolated nor self-
sufficient systems, they are designed and implemented as a
part of higher level systems.
Following is presented a classification of C3 I systems
according to the command level that they support: [Ref. 11: p:
99]
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• National (Strategic) level: these systems serve to
national authorities and are controlled by national
committees and organizations with national priority
missions and worldwide scope.
• Theater-level (Joint Forces) : these systems are focused on
theater-wide operations. They are controlled by respective
theater commander on chief, and include the headquarters
support systems of the unified commands.
• Tactical-level: these systems serve commanders below the
level of the service component commander. They include the
subsystems of the senior tactical headquarters, subsystems
used by lower levels of command, and subsystems used by
the individual unit commander as the final link in the C 2
structure
.
National C 3 I systems have the advantages of clear lines
of authority, well-defined doctrine, procedures and role of
the participants, as well as a finite number of interfaces
that facilitate the interoperability of the systems. Theater
and especially tactical C 3 I systems are much more complex,
with greater information requirements and with less time to
operate inside the enemy decision cycle and retain the
initiative; these aspects make interoperability, difficult to
attain at these levels.
The AirLand Battle Doctrine with its basic principles
of initiative, depth, agility and synchronization emphasize
the role of interoperability as a key factor in the achieve-
ment of success in the modern battlefield [Ref. 14].
Under the AirLand Battle Doctrine interoperability is not
restricted to one service alone; instead the doctrine is an
important approach to accomplish interoperability among
different services. The Army Tactical Command and Control
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System (ATCCS) is an example of a wide initiative that touches
upon all battlefield functions from the forward line of troops
back to theater boundary; and it is a joint effort to reach
real interoperability between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air
Force
.
To improve the interoperability in tactical C3 I systems
it is necessary to identify the variables that could be con-
trolled to obtain that improvement. Planning is one of those
variables and maybe the most effective. To assure effective
interoperability, the planning should be done in advance. This
conceptual process includes:
• Identification of interoperability needs.
• Translation of those needs into well defined C2 require-
ments .
• Comparison of current Command and Control systems,
Communication systems, and Information systems against the
C2 requirements, looking for inconsistency with the stated
doctrine and mission objectives for any command level.
The entire planning process should be driven by C 2
requirements that constitute a main factor in achieving
interoperability
.
Another variable to enhance C3I systems interoperabi-
lity is the design of C3I systems architecture, suitable for
the doctrine and mission of each particular service and the
design of a joint systems architecture to achieve
interoperability among the different services. Examples of the
efforts already accomplished in that direction include:
[Ref. 15]
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• The design and implementation of the Army Tactical Command
and Control System.
• The development of Functional Interoperability Architec-
tures .
• The development of Commander in Chief Interoperability
Architectures
.
2 . Tactical C3 architecture
Based on operational requirements for five major
battlefield areas (BFA) , the U.S. Army developed a integrated
C 3 I system known as the Army Tactical Command and Control
System (ATCCS) . As is shown in Figure 8, the ATCCS system
consists of five major BFA' s : Maneuver (MVR) , Fire Support
(FS) , Air Defense Artillery (ADA) , Intelligence/Electronic
Warfare (IEW) and Combat Service Support (CSS) . The tactical
communication systems that provides the communication backbone
for each BFA within its intended operational area are: Area
Common User System (ACUS) , Army Data Distribution System
(ADDS) and the Combat Net Radios (CNRs) [Ref . 16]
.
The following is the description of each BFA given in the
Ninth Symposium of Armed Forces Communications and Electronics
Association (AFCEA)
.
[Ref . 4: p. 32]
1 . Maneuver Control
The maneuver control area comprises the facilities
employed to plan, direct, coordinate and supervise the
combat activities of a combined arms force as it closes with
and destroys the enemy by use of fire and maneuver. This
includes the command, control and coordination of combat,
combat support and combat service support elements of the
forces in accordance with the commander's scheme of maneu-
ver.
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2 . Fire Support
The fire support area comprises the facilities employed
for command, control and coordination of activities related
to surface target development and the weapon systems and
munitions available to engage those targets in order to



































The intelligence/electronic warfare area comprises the
facilities employed for command, control and coordination of
activities related to intelligence collection, combat
information development, operations security and electronic
warfare
.
4 . Air Defense
The air defense area comprises the facilities employed
for command, control and coordination of Army activities
related to air defense management and the weapon systems and
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munitions available to destroy airborne targets in support
of the force commander.
5 . Combat Service Support
The combat service support area comprise the facilities
employed for the command, control and coordination of the
activities related to logistical support, personnel adminis-
tration and soldier support available for the execution of
those functions in support of the force commander.
The ATCCS is an integrated family of automated,
interoperable C 2 , communication and information systems that
provide C 3 support to the five BFAs described above.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the basic definitions and under-
standing of architecture in general and the tactical C 3 I
architecture in particular. The structure of the architectures
was described and it was shown how imperative it is that the
architecture reflect flexibility in its structure to allow the
commander to tailor it to the actual situation, in time and
organization, that he could face to better accomplish his
mission.
It also discussed a classification of C 3 I systems, and
analyzed two, among many, variables that can improve interope-
rability on those systems. Lastly, it described the components
of tactical C3I systems actually implemented in the U.S. Army.
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IV. DATA PROCESSING IN TACTICAL C3 ENVIRONMENT
A. C3 I INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1 . Overview
Most of the C 3 I systems have considered the single "C"
(Communications) part of the system as a critical factor of
system development, and they only secondarily addressed data
processing. The data processing functions included tend to be
mainly communication-oriented with message processing and
automated data base entry. The lack of attention toward
information systems at the beginning of the development of C 3 I
systems has produced an increment of interoperability problems
in these systems. These problems arise because many C 3 I
systems have been designed assuming that the information comes
into the system already processed. The information systems
have been limited to the Sense function, part of the Compare
function, and the Act function of the Command and Control
process.
Due to the dynamics of the "real world" and technolog-
ical developments, military operations are changing toward a
single and integrated battlefield. This change requires a
balanced development between a C 3 I system' s components and C 2
process functions.
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A clear description of the reasons is given by Gen.
Donn Starry, USA (Ret)
:
The command and control problem goes something like this:
To fight the battle successfully, the commander has to
find out what is going on, decide what to do about it,
tell somebody what to do, then keep track of how the
battle is going. He needs to turn that information-
decision cycle in time inside the enemy' s information-
decision cycle so that, instead of simply reacting to what
the enemy does, he can seize the initiative.
[Ref. 17]
2 . Information System Functions
In the tactical integrated C 3 I information system, it
is possible to identify four primary functions:
[Ref. 18]
1. Information transport : This function includes integration
of voice, graphics and imagery within the information system
that allows the use of communication means in a better way.
2. Information collection: This function will be carried out
by sensors and data processors, providing integrated
intelligence and real time targeting information.
3. Information management: This function will cover the
collection, management and distribution of information
needed by the battlefield Commander and his forces to
synchronize their actions effectively. One key characteris-
tic of an information management system will be its exis-
tence in distributed networks overlaid on the information
transport system.
4. Information denial: This function will be performed by
using jamming, self-protection and deception to enhance
combat effectiveness.
B. DATA FUSION PROCESS
Due to the technological advances and the dynamic changes
in military operations, the amount of information that must be
analyzed for any level of command has increased enormously.
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Today, to achieve a reduction in uncertainty when transforming
the raw data into information by technological means, the
development and use of a more sophisticated process of data
fusion is required.
The current technology in computers, hardware and soft-
ware, can provide such tools. It also becomes a key factor in
the preparation and execution of information exchange that
takes place in any C 3 I system.
The fusion of data is carried out by each and every one of
the system's components of the nodal ATCCS . The achievement of
an integrated battlefield will be the result of improvement in
the fusion process that provides a greater information level
and operational significance, true interoperability, and
integration of large and non-comparable systems and their
related subsystems. The fusion process also makes possible the
positive identification of targets and extrapolation of
results.
According to Gen. Federico V. Romano (Italy) , the fusion
process concept can be segregated into three subconcepts:
Modularity, Correlation and Processing, and Integration.
[Ref. 19]
1 . Modularity
The module is a subunit with an input/output relation-
ship clearly established so that each module is fully inter-
changeable with its analogous counterpart produced and built
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elsewhere. The requirement of modularity is the use of common
software to permit the modules to communicate with each other,
and that each module should receive as input the output of a
preceding module, regardless of the structure of the composite
system.
Modularity also implies that there are a minimum
number of modules to allow the composite system to automati-
cally adapt its outputs according to the environmental
changes. If the modularity concept is not applied constantly,
the information content and the information flow rate could
suffer degradation and become useless at the end of the
process
.
2 . Correlation and Processing
To make the best and most effective use of the data
gathered from different sources, it is necessary to correlate
them. The correlation of the data from multiple sources will
produce an outcome that will provide the following advantages:
• The information level, in a generic way, will be greater
than the sum of the individual contributions of each
source.
• The operational value will benefit from the synergistic
effect of the correlation itself and therefore will exceed
that of each single source.
Two important aspects should be considered in the
design of a correlation and processing system: the architec-
ture of the data base and the comparison process. The archi-
tecture of the data base will determine the optimization of
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search techniques used to locate data rapidly that, in turn,
enhance the timeliness of the correlation process. The
comparison is a more difficult process. In this process the
data received from different sources are analyzed to determine
if they belong to, or define, the same entity or target.
3 . Integration
Integration makes it possible for a commander to get
a global perception of the battle situation. It also requires
creating a system starting from various modules and sub-
modules. Depending on the characteristics of the modules, and
the quantity and quality of their links, it will be possible
to reach different levels of system integration. The integra-
tion has also the advantage of both avoiding undue duplication
and gaining flexibility.
C. CURRENT TACTICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The five nodal systems of the ATCCS have their correspond-
ing main information systems, as shown in Figure 8. Each
system consists of several subsystems and their interrelation-
ships . For the purpose of this thesis, only the main and
integrative system of each BFA will be addressed. A general
description of each of those systems is provided below:
[Ref. 20]
1. Maneuver Control System (MCS)
The MCS is a collection of computer equipment and
software that support operations planning and control at the
ATCCS maneuver control nodes. It is designed to assist the
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commander and his staff by providing information on his own
forces, enemy forces and the characteristics of the battle-
field. The MCS provides battlefield information by collect-
ing, processing and displaying data generated within the
air/land combat environment.
2. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
AFATDS is a single, integrated battlefield management and
decision support system that satisfies command and control,
deep battle and light infantry division requirements. It
will function at levels from artillery forward observer
through theater headquarters as one of the five battlefield
automation systems of the ATCCS . It provides fully automated
support for planning, coordination and control of all fire
support assets (mortars, close-air support, naval gunfire,
attack helicopters and offensive electronic warfare,
artillery cannon, rockets and guided missiles) in the
execution of close support counterfire, interdiction and
suppression of enemy air defense. AFATDS supports fire
planning and coordination of the employment of all services
to complement the commander's scheme of maneuver, also it
will set up detailed commander' s guidance in the automation
of operational planning, movement control, targeting, target
value analysis and fire support planning and execution.
3. Forward Area Air Defense System Command, Control and
Intelligence (FAAD C 2 I)
The FAAD C 2 I is a computer-based command and control
system. It is dependent on the Army data distribution system
(ADDS) to alert and integrate Army FAADs against enemy
forces ranging from helicopters to high-performance air-
craft. It provides accurate information in real time for
FAAD weapons and command posts. It consists of command and
control command posts and sensors that provide air surveil-
lance and identification in the battlefield area. The
mission is accomplished through the collection, digital
processing and dissemination of target information;
generation of air threat warning and weapon control orders;
and target data processing and display capabilities at
battery, platoon and fire unit levels. The system also
provides target tracking information to armor, infantry and
aviation units having secondary air defense capability and
missions
.
4. All Source Analysis System (ASAS)
The Army's all-source analysis system is a computer based
battlefield commander's intelligence support system. ASAS
receives, stores and rapidly fuses real world battlefield
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information for presentation to commanders in support of the
decision-making process. ASAS will have direct connectivity
to ATCCS, enabling the battlefield situation to be coordi-
nated from division to echelons above corps. This connectiv-
ity, as well as direct connectivity between ASAS and the Air
Force's enemy situation correlation element (ENSCE) , will
assist commanders in making well-advised and timely deci-
sions unconstrained by time and location. ASAS/ENSCE are
referred as "the central nervous system of the deep attack"
because it supports the targeting process by early identifi-
cation of high value targets and by providing accurate
descriptions and locations to the weapons system. Both are
the key to success in deep attack missions an engagement of
follow-on forces.
5. Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS)
The CSSCS is an evolutionary software development
designed to provide timely and reliable logistics, medical,
financial and personnel information essential for planning
and decision making by theater and tactical maneuver force
and logistics commanders. The system also provides automated
C 2 capabilities for analysis of current operating allowanc-
es, sustainment planning and execution of CSS plans in
support of combat operations. CSSCS provides an automated
interface between the other ATCCS' s functional areas and the
theater standard army management information systems
(STAMIS) that are part of the CSSCS' s functional area.
D. TECHNOLOGY OF DECISION AIDS IN C3I SYSTEMS
While the reduction of uncertainty through the technologi-
cal approach that enhance the collection, comparison or
integration of data and its transformation into information,
is essential to successful C3 I systems, it is not enough. This
information must be converted to knowledge through a process
similar to the one depicted in Figure 9 [Ref. 10: p. 3].
One way to achieve this is through training, simulations,
war games, and exercises; a second way is to reduce the






Figure 9. Data, Information and Knowledge
through the use of decision aids, to improve his/her decision-
making process[Ref. 10: p. 4].
The evolution of the cognitive processes that allow this
conversion have not improved at the same rate as the communi-
cations means and weapon systems. This has produced the
under-utilization of those resources.
Decision aids (DA) should be considered as an integral
component of the C3 I systems. They should be applied to each
and every one of the C 2 process functions. The DA also must be
considered as a component that improve the commander's
intelligence, not as substitute of it.
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Decision Aids can help military personnel by reducing
stress, information overload and manual tasks; by provid-
ing experts in military decision making with a fail-safe
check list; by guiding novices through unfamiliar decision
making situations; and by applying a logical structure to
decision making . . . Time originally spent correlating
messages, plotting points on a map and looking up informa-
tion in publications can now be spent analyzing incoming
information or applying it where it is more
useful. [Ref . 21]
The application of decision aids to the decision making
process can range from the simple automation of a task to the
use of artificial intelligence for complex automation of an
expert's heuristic reasoning ability.
The techniques or tools used in the problem solving
process depend on the type of problem to be solved, and how it
is structured.
Usually four categories of problems are defined : [Ref. 22]
[Ref. 23]
• Deterministic problems: These are well structured and are
more operational in nature.
• Stochastic problems: These involve considerable uncertain-
ty and require dealing with many unknowns
.
• Complex problems : These are ones that involve many
interacting variables that are highly interdependent and
that change over time or are combinatorial in nature.
• Organizational problems: These problems require much more
human intervention for their solution. The necessary
manager skills include understanding of human behavior,
interpersonal interaction, conflict resolution, negotia-
tion, and leadership.
According to their structure the decision for problem-
solving can be classified as: structured, semistructure, and
unstructured. [Ref. 22] [Ref. 24]
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A decision is unstructured when:
• The objectives are ambiguous and non-operational, or if
the objectives are operational, they are numerous and
conflicting.
• It is difficult to predict in advance the effect on
decision outcomes of the actions taken by the decision-
maker .
• It is uncertain what actions taken by the decision maker
might affect decisions.
Table I shows a matrix with the relationship between the
different categories of problems and the type of decisions
that decision-makers have to make to solve them. Using this
classification scheme, the way in which decision aids can be
used in problem-solving can be represented. The general idea
of this chart is the more complex and unstructured the
problem, the more direct human intervention is required for
its solution. Into each block is shown the frequently used
decision aids for the particular type of decision and problem.
These decision aids range from highly standardized tools and
techniques, as in the upper left hand box, to the application
of highly human interacting tools, like in the last two boxes
at the lower right hand of the chart [Ref . 22]
.
The decision aids became an area of highest importance in
the growth of C 3 I systems. When implemented, they will help to
reduce the interoperability problems by performing better data
control. In this manner, the excessive production of data in
the current environment will be transformed into useful
information applicable for use by the commander and his staff.
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TABLE I. DECISION AIDS APPLICATIONS CHART
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1 . Operations Research
Operations research is a scientific approach to
problem solving that is based on the extensive use of quanti-
tative analysis. These techniques are highly structured and
well defined, and their applications are usually made to model
physical entities or events that are clear-cut or repetitive.
These situations occur in an unambiguous environment, with
clearly delineated procedures and responsibilities, and the
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problems are well defined so that they can be solved by
applying specific algorithms.
Operations research is the most widely and intensively
used technique since its development during World War II.
Included in operations research methodologies are: statistics,
computer simulation, Pert/CPM, linear programming, queuing
theory, nonlinear programming, dynamic programming, and game
theory
.
Another evolutionary approach is decision analysis. It
is a more general methodology than operations research. Its
purpose is to impose logical structure on a decision maker's
reasoning process by using: analytic models of expected
utility, multi-attribute analysis, and bayesian hierarchical
inference.
The decision analysis approach is applied mainly in
the solution of complex problems. It attempts to break that
complex problem into small pieces and requires a
quantification by the decision maker of his perceptions and
values for each facet of the problem. The quantifications are
then combined using the mentioned probabilistic techniques and
models for dealing with uncertainty. [Ref. 21: p. 45]
The problems addressed by these techniques include:
determination of course of actions, and determination of
optimal resource allocations.
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2 . Artificial Intelligence
The evolution in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has
reached the level that has made possible the implementations
of decision aids based in AI as part of C 3 I systems. There are
many areas of AI research, but two apply most to decision
aids: Expert Systems (ES) and Decision Support Systems (DSS)
.
a . Expert Systems
Expert systems are computer programs that can
perform specialized tasks that constitute professional
expertise at a level of (or beyond) a human expert. They are
also called knowledge-based systems since they rely on
reservoirs of knowledge.
For the expert system to be useful it should be
constrained to a specific area of expertise or domain. This
may be determined if the following criteria are met:
• The expert system answers questions about subjects in its
realm of understanding.
• It solves problems that do not have algorithmic solution.
• It exercises planning by progressing from a given state to
a goal state.
• It reacts to changes in its environment.
• It is capable of altering its own reasoning based on
observed trends
.
The expert system role related to interoperability
has gained relevance with the increase in systems' complexity.
This area of application covers all the functional areas of
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the C3 I systems, especially the areas of communication,
information processing and intelligence.
Possible communication applications of expert
systems include: planning, managing, interconnection of
tactical communication means; routing, and allocation of
channel capacity base on real constraints.
The expert systems capabilities also could partial-
ly serve three major intelligence functions that supplement
the human limitation: [Ref . 25]
• Fusion of multi-source data into a mosaic view of targets,
conditions and situations.
• Indicator highlighting of various forms. For example, the
aggregation of sensor observations from different times
and places and in different forms to note the thresholds
of activity sufficient for triggering an indicator.
• Hypothesis verification in the sense of showing that
collected information is tending to confirm or to deny
some previously imagined, institutionalized scenario of a
potential situation and its dynamics.
Related to the information processing, the expert
systems could be useful in the data distribution, formatting,
and routing of information in interconnected tactical net-
works .
b. Decision Support Systems
Decision support systems are computer-based systems
that allow the user(s) to make effective decisions in
semistructured or unstructured problems. [Ref. 22]
The application fields of the DSS are broader than
the field of expert systems due to their advantages in dealing
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with unstructured decision, their flexibility in human-system
interaction, and the improvement of personnel efficiency. An
additional reason for the wider scope is that they are more
"friendly" decision aids for the commander and his staff. The
following additional reasons account for the increased level
of interest and the requirement for employing DSS: [Ref. 22]
• The DSS fits in with the general trend in information
system development, as office automation, advanced
integrated systems, etc.
• Improvements in computer hardware capabilities, availabil-
ity, and software maturity (In both languages and in DSS's
generators)
.
• Increased user sophistication and renewed interest in
quantitative methods by improving heuristic.
• DSS's provide a familiar representation for decision-
makers conceptualization, facilitate functioning of the
decision process's operations, and provide control aids
that allow the decision-maker to exercise direct personal
control over the whole decision process.
The efficiency and utility of the DSS will depend
greatly on the design of the Man Machine Interface (MMI) . The
ill-structured nature of the decision in a combat situation
makes the use of these tools more suitable than any conven-
tional solution. However, the need to provide the commander
and his staff with a powerful, interactive interface make its
achievement both conceptually and technically difficult.
Current studies suggest that 80% of a DSS developmental effort
is devoted to the MMI design. [Ref. 22]
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c. Review of ES and DSS Applicability
Table II depicts a comparison of the main charac-
teristics between the ES, DSS, and conventional programs [Ref
.
22]. The table shows the advantages and disadvantages of ES,
DSS, and conventional programs in the problem-solving process.
This is performed by relating and grouping comparative factors
by area of application (domain) , reasoning and searching




The intention of this chapter has been to present the
basic description of information systems in the tactical
environment through the description of its functions. It has
also attempted to describe the transformation process, where
data collected by multiple sources is fused into knowledge
using technological and cognitive methods. The design and
implementation of information systems was also reviewed.
Later, current tactical information systems implemented in
the ATCCS were described.
Finally, decision aids and their role in the C3 I systems
were described. The DAs were also classified according to the
type and structure of problem that they help to solve, and
their comparative characteristics were presented so that the
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Regarding this last point, and in conclusion, it is
considered necessary to continue the research and implementa-
tion of Decision Support Systems. They will supplement human
abilities in using general knowledge to respond effectively in
real time, emulate and follow human reasoning processes,
acquire and apply knowledge, manipulate and communicate ideas,
and focus human attention on relevant information. The early
application of AI to the C 3 I systems indicates that this
technology will be able to bring solutions for many current
C 3 I system problems.
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V. TACTICAL COMMUNICATION IN C3I SYSTEMS
A. COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
The systems supporting the U.S. Army's tactical communica-
tion are: Area Common User System (ACUS) , Army Data Distribu-


















Figure 10. ATCCS Communication Networks
These systems are the foundation that sustain the
transfer of data generated by information systems. They also
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support and integrate the Command and Control communications
of the five BFAs
.
The systems meet the conditions of reliability, rapidity
and comprehension required for modern communications infra-
structure. The following sections will describe each of these
systems, their related subsystems, and their interrelation-
ships. [Ref. 20: p. 314 - 335]
1 . Area Common User System
ACUS is the area system that provides the backbone of
tactical communications. It will also be the key to achieving
interoperability between the Army's networks. ACUS consists of
two basic area systems: TRI-TAC, a multi-service communication
system and family of equipment; and the corp area system,
Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) . Similarities on engineering
and operational characteristics exist in the architectures of
both systems. MSE is the largest fielding effort made by the
U.S. Army for tactical communication systems.
[Ref. 26]
2 . Combat Net Radio
CNR has three primary subsystems: Single Channel
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) , Improved High
Frequency Radios (IHFRs) , and the Single Channel Objective
Tactical Terminals (SCOTTs) . This is the system primarily
employed by the front line unit, in combination with Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)
.
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The combination of these communication systems
provides a secure flow of voice and data communications from
the strategic levels to the front line. The interoperability
issue has been incorporated into the design and fielding of
these systems.
a . SINCGARS
SINCGARS is a family of very high frequency (VHF)
,
frequency modulated (FM) radios that provides the primary
means of communication from the brigade to the platoon level.
Although the system is designed to support voice/data line-of-
sight communications and record traffic messages, voice will
be, in the short term, the dominant application of this
system. [Ref. 20: p. 313 - 314]
The radio units ensure reliability, electronic
counter-countermeasures, maintainability, and communications
security. The system is able to operate using a spread-
spectrum technique known as frequency hopping. This technique
allows the system to operate efficiently in a hostile environ-
ment due to its antijamming characteristics. The system design
goals include a manual-mode interface with the ACUS, and in
the near future, an automated-mode interface. SINCGARS is also
suited to the rapid tempo of operations by allowing a command-
er to rapidly change nets as he moves about the battlefield.
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Jb. IHFR
IHFR is a family of High Frequency (HF) radios that
supports voice and data communications. The system provides
dedicated beyond "line of sight" (LOS) communication, and
constitutes backup for satellite communication. These units
also contain an application module that provides antijamming
capability by using a frequency hopping technique.
[Ref. 27]
C . SCOTT
SCOTT is a satellite single channel communication
system that provides secure voice and data capabilities. These
units have been developed to operate in an electronically-
hostile environment. It is a man-pack system that is especial-
ly suitable for use by small, mobile units such as special
operations forces. [Ref. 26: p. 25]
3 . Army Data Distribution System
ADDS consists of two main subsystems: EPLRS and the
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) . ADDS
provide an integrated, effective, and efficient means to
communicate in near real time, and to control data transfer on
the battlefield. The integration of both systems is one of the




EPLRS system was designed to support tactical
operations on the battlefield with a reliable data communica-
tions system. It provides tactical units with electronic real
time position and navigation capabilities [Ref. 26: p. 26].
The system links the high-priority elements of each BFA, and
also provides communication between these areas. These links
are implemented through use of automatic integral relays with
interfaces to the host equipment at each end. The system
supplies individual paths with data rates up to 1,200 bps . The
collection of the data can be done automatically in tens of
seconds. [Ref. 20: p. 314]
Jb . JTIDS
JTIDS constitutes the Army's primary data distribu-
tion system forward of the brigade areas for those units with
weapons systems requiring near-real response times. The JTIDS
deployment is from brigade to theater level. This LOS system
provides data distribution capabilities using common data link
standards in ultra high frequency (UHF) . It also includes
facilities that support voice subsystems. [Ref. 27: p. 130]
B. MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT
MSE represents the new-generation battlefield integrator
systems that are being fielded around the world. The RITA of
the French Armed Forces and the CATRIN of Italian Army are
also examples of this new type of system. RITA and MSE systems
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have minor differences, most of them due to interface require-
ments to make them interoperable with older systems
.
MSE provides both mobile and stationary users in corps and
division areas with automatic switched, survivable, secure
voice, data and facsimile communications. A packet switching
capability is also available to effect communication between
computers. MSE is the full-featured all-digital telecommunica-
tions system for the tactical battlefield. [Ref. 20: p. 312]
The description of the MSE system will follow the outline
made by Captain John Melville Blaine, U.S. Army, in his thesis
at the Naval Postgraduate School [Ref. 28] . The sys-
tem description was broken down into five functional areas:
area coverage, wire subscriber access, mobile subscriber
access, subscriber access and system control.
1 . Area Coverage
The MSE networks' capabilities and services are
designed to support tactical corps consisting of five divi-
sions in a geographic area up to 37,500 square kilometers. The
communication network will consist of Node Centers (NC) , Radio
Access Units (RAU) , and System Control Centers (SCC)
.
The MSE system lets subscribers communicate with each
other on a discrete address basis, using fixed directory
numbers regardless of a subscriber's battlefield location.
The area coverage is provided by the tandem switched
network interfaced with mobile subscriber access and wire
subscriber access functions. Area coverage also provides
flood search routing and a means of interfacing with non-
MSE networks such as TRI-TAC switches, other services TRI-
TAC unit level circuit switches, and NATO Architecture.
[Ref. 28: p. 9]
55
Node Centers: The communication network consists of 42
NCs interlinked by LOS radio trunking. The NCs will usually be
separated by 35 to 40 Km and linked with at least three other
NCs. They provide robust command and control access for both
stationary and mobile subscribers as they move about the
battlefield [Ref. 26: p. 26]. NCs are the backbone of the
network and operate relatively independently of existing
command structures, providing communications to the users on
an area basis. Each NC consists of a Node Center Switch (NCS),
two RAUs, four LOS terminals, a Node Management Facility
(NMF) , and a Node Support Vehicle (NSV) . [Ref. 28: p. 9-10]
Node Center Switches: NCS combine in a single switch-
ing function the ligital switching, flood search routing and
subscriber management. They provide access for mobile and 24
local wire MSE subscribers and perform all node switching and
control functions in the MSE network. NCS supply automatic
tandem switching for the system and network interface for
subscriber access elements. They also furnish automatic
subscriber finding features that allow permanent subscriber
address assignment. [Ref. 28: p. 11-13]
Radio Access Unit: The RAU provides an automatic
interface between mobile subscribers and the network. The
number of mobile subscribers supported by each RAU is a
function of the NCS to which it is connected. It is also a
function of the density or distribution of the mobile units in
that particular geographic area. The average number of mobile
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subscribers per RAU is 25. The RAUs allow the users to: [Ref.
28: p. 13]
• Access the network and dial up any other subscriber,
either static or mobile, without having to know their
physical location.
• Maintain communication on the move, as long as they are in
the area of coverage of any RAU.
• Automatic reaffiliation to the nearest RAU, whether a user
call is in progress or not.
Node Management Facility: NMF provides the equipment
and space required by the node commander to manage resources
.
NMF, deployed as part of each NC and LEN, connects to the NCS
and the large extension node switch (LENS) at each site. [Ref.
28: p. 15]
2 . Wire Subscriber Access
Wire subscriber access gives static subscriber access
to the network, through large extension nodes (LEN) and small
extension nodes (SEN) . LEN and SEN consist of switchboards
located at battalion and higher headquarters command posts as
well as LOS radio links to connect the switchboard to the grid
network through the NCs. [Ref. 26: p. 26]
3 . Mobile Subscriber Access
Mobile subscriber access permits subscribers to place
or receive calls while moving through the battlefield. The
mobile subscriber radio telephone (MRST) is the user terminal
that permits the mobile subscriber to access the network. It
provides subscribers a means of discretely addressing switched
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common-user subscribers via radio linkage to the RAU. This
feature enhances mobility in a battlefield. The equipment is
also designed to provide a digital data port. [Ref. 28: p. 19]
4 . Subscriber Access
The subscriber terminal allow users to place calls and
pass data through the MSE network. The main pieces that make
up the subscriber access area are: [Ref. 28: p. 21 - 22]
• Digital nonsecure voice telephone (DNVT) : It is the
primary subscriber terminal used in the MSE system wire
access areas. DNVT is a digital, four-wire telephone set
which is capable of transmitting and receiving digital
information and signaling. It provides data interface for
the connection of facsimile or single subscriber terminal
(SST) data devices.
• Facsimile: The unit can transmit digital or analog
facsimiles in black and white or eight shades of gray
graphic or text information between remote and/or central-
ized communications facilities. The traffic can be sent in
noncompressed, compressed, or compressed with error
detection data modes. The operational data rate is 16
Kbps.
The single subscriber terminal (SST) is a user
terminal available for data message handling through the
network but is not an integral part of the subscriber access
area. SST interfaces with the data port on both DNVT and DSVT
and passes data through the MSE system to interoperate with
the automatic message switch of TRI-TAC.
5 . System Control Center
The SCC is mainly a command and control facility. It
also includes some of the technical control functions neces-
sary to manage the highly centralized MSE network. The SCC is
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an automated facility that accesses the network through any
NCS or LENS. The network managers are assisted by the SCC to
perform the following: [Ref. 28: p. 23 - 24]
• System engineering
• Frequency engineering and management
• Directing deployment of system assets
• Maintaining status of resources
• Enabling a rapid response to changes in mission and
subscriber demands
The specific software tools provided by the SCC are:
• LOS and VHF frequency management
• COMSEC management
• High-point surveys
• Signal path profiling
• System logistics and personnel
• Equipment status reporting
€ . System Interoperability
The MSE system meets the known requirements to
interface with the TRI-TAC system, CNR system, NATO systems,
and host nation commercial telephone systems. Commercial
office interfaces are necessary to permit users access to the
local commercial telephone system in the area of operations.
[Ref. 28: p. 27-28]
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C. TACTICAL MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
The modern tactical communication systems are highly
dependent upon wireless communication and spread-spectrum
techniques. Mobile and secure telephone and digital transmis-
sion features are the factors that enhance the concept of
battlefield mobility. They also introduce in the command and
control process the timing required by modern commanders and
their staffs to conduct the battle.
Due to the importance of these systems, it is imperative
to have a clear understanding of the various key, and contro-
versial, issues that determine a mobile communication archi-
tecture. George Calhoun is his book Digital Cellular Radio
includes as key issues: [Ref. 29]
• Selection of analog versus digital technology
• Wideband versus narrowband systems channelization of the
radio spectrum
• Choice of multiplexing techniques
Because of the importance and the scope of the last two
issues, they will be treated in detail below. Regarding the
first issue, the technological evolution and currently fielded
military applications determine the predominance of digital
technology. This technology presents greater capacities and
better performance than the analog technology.
1 . Channelization of the Radio Spectrum
Channelization has been the keystone of mobile radio for
fifty years. Because of the scarcity of spectrum, the
channelization assumption has driven radio engineers to
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look for ways of reducing the bandwidth of the voice
circuits. [Ref. 29: p. 340]
There are two broad and very different ways to parcel
up the total available spectrum into individual telephone




In narrowband systems the total available spectrum
is divided into a large number of relatively narrow radio
channels, defined by carrier frequency. These types of
channelized systems have a number of common characteristics.
[Ref. 29: p. 277]
• They imply the necessity of sharply defined emissions
limitations on individual transmitters to avoid adjacent
channel interference.
• The transmission occurs within the coherence or correla-
tion bandwidth. It means that two signals on near-adjacent
channels will tend to fade at the same time. If a fade
occurs, the entire narrowband transmission will be
affected.
• They are inherently blocking systems, and the blocking
probability becomes the key measure of service quality.
The number of calls that can be handled for a base
transmitter are limited to the number of operating
channels. As the blocking probability rises, the only
recourse to reduce it is by adding channels per cell or by




In wideband systems, instead of dividing the total
available spectrum into a large number of individual channels,
the entire channel is made available to every user. Further-
more, a large number of individual users can all use the same
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wideband channels simultaneously. These systems are known
usually as spread-spectrum systems, and their characteristics
include: [Ref. 29: p. 280 - 282]
• The transmission bandwidth exceeds the coherence band-
width, consequently a multipath-induced fade does not
affect the entire signal.
• There is no hard limit on the number of mobile users that
can simultaneously access a transmitter base. There is not
a blocking condition, instead there is a deterioration in
the quality of the services.
The spread-spectrum (SS) techniques are the
backbone of the modern tactical systems. These techniques are
just now being experimented with for commercial applications.
However, many details of this technique are still classified
for security reasons. Spread-spectrum techniques solve many of
the traditional RF problems, such as spectrum efficiency,
mobile-unit cost, multipath, and interference. There are two
major categories of these techniques: [Ref. 30]
• Frequency hopping SS (FH/SS)
• Direct sequence SS (DS/SS)
The essential shared characteristics of these
techniques are: [Ref. 29: p. 355]
• The transmission of a voice circuit over a bandwidth much
wider than would be normally required in a conventional
channelized radio system.
• The coding of the transmission by means of a random
sequence that is shared by both transmitter and receiver.
• The assignment of different random sequences to distin-
guish different users.
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2 . Multiplexing and Access Techniques
The terms "multiplexing and "multiple access" refer to the
sharing of a fixed communication resource (CR) . There is
a subtle difference between multiplexing and multiple
access. With multiplexing, users' requirements or plans
for CR sharing are fixed, or at most, slowly changing. The
resource allocation is assigned a priori, and the sharing
is usually a process that takes place within the confines
of a local site. Multiple access, however, usually
involves the remote sharing of a resource, such as a
satellite. With a dynamically changing multiple access
scheme, a system controller must become aware of each
user's CR needs; the amount of time required for this
information transfer constitutes an overhead and sets an
upper limit on the efficiency of the utilization of the
CR. [Ref. 30: p. 476]
Different methods exist for allocating individual
channels to individual users on demand. Also, the access
system should allow any user to utilize any channel in a fully
trunked system. The procedure to accomplish this is called
multiple access.
There are three categories of alternatives to imple-
ment multiple access: Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA) , Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) , and Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) . Figure 11 illustrates how
each of these alternatives deals with the signals in the
frequency and the time domain.
a. FDMA
FDMA is the simplest multiple access arrangement;
it is the implementation of frequency differentiated narrow-
band channels within the total available spectrum. Each user
is allocated a fixed portion of the frequency spectrum. The
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characteristics of this type of multiple access scheme
include: [Ref. 29: p. 365 - 367]
• The mobile unit must have frequency agility, that is, it
must be able to tune to every one of the available
frequencies
.
• The transmission is continuous in both directions, and it
is required that duplexer circuitry be available at the
mobile and at the base station radios for simultaneous
operations
.
• The system is simple and synchronization is not required.
• The system requires the use of guardbands, which become
unused portions of spectrum.
• The system performance is frequency dependent, and is
greatly affected by channel interference, and fading.
• The distribution of channel per frequency band is limited.
b. TDMA
TDMA is a more complex architecture. It provides
the user with the full channel capacity but divides the
channel usage into time slots. TDMA structures can differ in
the bandwidth of the carrier frequency or the bit rate in the
channel, and in the number of time slots defined in the
channel. The characteristics of this type of multiple access
scheme include: [Ref. 29: p. 369 - 373]
• The requirement of guard time, which results in unused
time intervals between slots.
• The requirement of a synchronization scheme because of the
complexity of system operation in the time domain.
• The limited distribution of channels per cell.
• The received signal is affected by multipath propagation
produced by reflections from a building, the terrain,
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Figure 11. Multiplexing Compared
• Transmission from the mobile units is not continuous, but
occurs during specified time slots only.
C. CDMA
CDMA is the form of multiple access employed by
spread- spectrum wideband systems. These systems are based on
the principle that each user is distinguished from all other
by the use of a unique pseudonoise (PN) code. In an FH/SS
system, this code is used to generate a unique sequence of
frequency hops. In a DS/SS system, the code is used to
generate the randomized noiselike high-bit-rate signal that is
mixed with the information signal to spread the spectrum. The
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characteristics of this type of multiple access scheme
include: [Ref. 29: p. 373 - 379]
• Despite the scheme's complexity, synchronization is not
required.
• The distribution of channels per cell is unlimited.
• Fading resistance. If a portion of the spectrum is
affected, only during the time a user hop goes into the
affected portion of the spectrum will the user experience
degradation.
• Jam resistance.
• Communications privacy is ensured since the transmission




The technological characteristics and design of the
tactical communication systems that have been presented
provide complete, reliable, and secure links throughout all
command levels in the battlefield. The systems have enough
flexibility to be tailored by a commander to his/her own
communications needs and leadership style.
Communication technology has provided excellent systems,
but these systems should be utilized with a disciplined
information flow to take major advantage of their capabili-
ties. This issue manifests the link between the information
needs and the communication needs. A lack of balance in this
relationship could waste important and vital resources at
critical times.
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Two systems appear as the core of the C 3 I system from the
tactical mobility point of view: SINCGARS and MSE . These
systems improve ground tactical communication support, and
their embodied technology thus permits the commander greater
freedom on the battlefield. The experience from the military
operations in the Middle East will confirm the issue, or if
they show that the systems suffer from a lack of interopera-
bility, major efforts should be devoted to solve those
failures that jeopardize the implementation of the total
integrated battlefield concept.
Finally, the trends in mobile communication promise a more
efficient use of the spectrum, a better quality of service,
and a greater system capacity by using spread-spectrum
techniques and implementing CDMA multiplexing and access
scheme.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented the current tactical communica-
tion systems that support the information flow in the U.S.
Army at the tactical level. The three major communications
systems and their corresponding subsystems were also de-
scribed.
The MSE system was described in more detail due to its
importance for interoperability in the tactical environment.
Later, the basic concepts underlying mobile communications,
such as channelization of the radio spectrum and multiple
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access schemes were analyzed. Finally, conclusions about
tactical systems and likely future developments in the mobile




. NETWORKS IN INTEGRATED C3 SYSTEMS
A . OVERVIEW
This chapter focuses on C 3 network concepts, and will
provide background and analysis about networks in a tactical
environment
.
The highly mobile and distributed C 3 environment requires
a secure and reliable data flow among subscribers of any level
of command. That data flow can be provided by various tactical
and strategic networks. To achieve an integrated battlefield,
it is essential that these networks be developed with an
interoperable orientation.
Understanding networks requires that the concept be
defined and that a distinction be made between networks and
communications, because both terms, despite their differences,
are usually used interchangeably.
A network consists of the collection of nodes that send to
or receive from other nodes information and data together with
the transmission paths, called links, which are used to effect
the exchange of information and data. Nodes may be located at
ground command posts, on aircraft, on sensors, or on satel-
lites in earth orbit. The communication means used to estab-
lish the links include antennas, wire, coaxial cable, or
optical fiber. [Ref. 31]
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The C 3 network concepts address the mathematical and
logical processes, and procedures that control and manage
the C 3 network, and its associated processes and communi-
cations links. This network provides the high performance,
fault-tolerant, secure, and survivable C 3 environment
within which the battle-management algorithms function.
Topics addressed as part of the C 3 networks concepts
include protocols, distributed control concepts, distrib-
uted operating systems, and management of distributed data
bases. [Ref. 31: p. 2 - 3]
The boundaries between networking and communications are
not clear, so it is necessary to emphasize their differences
and applications.
1 . Communications
Communications concepts are related to: [Ref. 31: p.
3]
• Established links between node pairs that have sufficient
capacity, acceptable low error rates, and acceptable high
resistance to interception.
• Choice of the means to accomplish the communication that
include transmission medium, multiplexing techniques,
modulation and detection schemes, and spread-spectrum
techniques, etc.
• In the setting of standards, communication functions are
carried out by the lower levels or layers.
2 . Networking
Network concepts are related to: [Ref. 31: p. 3]
• Managing communication resources so that messages are
delivered reliably, with minimum delay.
• Procedures to promote a robust network so that functions
can be accomplished even in cases of node and link
failures or under heavy traffic conditions. These proce-
dures include algorithms for specifying location of point-
to-point links, implementing adaptative routing strate-
gies, providing message flow and congestion control, etc.
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• In setting standards, networking functions occupy the
contiguous and higher level communication functions.
B. NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
A network architecture encompasses hardware, software,
data link controls, standards, topologies, and protocols. It
describes the components, how they operate, their relation-
ships, and what physical form they take.
Figure 12 depicts the International Standards Organization
(ISO) Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model. This
reference model does not specified protocols, but provides an
accepted and suitable framework for the development of
standards. The reader should note that no unique approach to
solve the interoperability problem is prescribed.
The majority of the protocols that make up the different
architectures are base upon the concept of layered protocols.
The software and hardware at the network stations consist of
a wide range of functions to support the communications
activities. To handle the complexity of these functions many
systems are designed and structured with layering of the
functions. A layered protocol can provide: [Ref. 32]
• A logical decomposition of a complex system into smaller
and more comprehensible parts (layers)
.
• Standard interfaces between the layered functions.
• Symmetry in functions performed at each layer in a system.
Each layer in a station performs the same function (s) as
its counterpart in other stations.
• A means to predict and control any changes made to logic.
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Figure 12. The OS I model
A detailed description of the ISO model can be
obtained from a variety of sources, so in this section only
the main features of each layer will be presented: [Ref. 32:
p. 283 - 284]
• Layer 1. Physical layer : Provides physical connection
between equipments. The functions within this layer are
responsible for activating, maintaining, and deactivating
a physical circuit between communicating devices.
• Layer 2. Data link layer : It is responsible for the
transfer of data over the channel. Its functions include
providing for the detection of transmission errors, and
providing mechanisms to recover from lost, duplicated, or
erroneous data.
• Layer 3. Network Layer : It is responsible for the transfer
of data through a communication subnet. It provides the
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services of network routing and congestion control. This
layer specifies the type and format of packet to send
through the subnet
.
• Layer 4. Transport Layer : It is responsible for the
reliable, sequenced delivered, error control, and flow
control of data from end to end, over a network. It
establishes, maintains, and terminates a logical connec-
tion between users.
• Layer 5. Session Layer : It serves as the user interface
for the transport layer. The layer provides for an
organized means to exchange data between users.
• Layer 6. Presentation Layer : It performs the services of
encoding, data compression, and data encryption. This
layer provides for the syntax of data, that is data
representation.
• Layer 7. Application Layer : This layer supports user
application processes. Particularly, this layer deals with
the semantics of data.
Some criticisms of the OSI model are: [Ref. 32: 286 -
287]
• The scope of the functions performed in any given layer is
somewhat arbitrary.
• The layers require substantial computational resources to
perform their functions.
• Design trade-offs between layers still need to be under-
taken in the formulation of standards meeting military
requirements
.
• Duplication of functions exists across several layers.
2 . Other Network Architectures
The efforts toward standardization were, and are, made
by governments, international organizations, and leading
computer and communication companies. In this section, the
reader will learn about architectures developed by the U.S.
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Government, DOD, IBM, and Digital Equipment Corporation. This
is not an exclusive list, but it should illustrate the
diversity in the established standards. It also shows the
complexity of making the current networks interoperable with
each other.
1. GOSIP: The U.S. Government Open System Interconnection
Profile (GOSIP) represents the final agreement on a set of
OSI protocols for computer networking that is used by U.S.
government agencies for product and services acquisition. It
provides implementation specifications from standards issued
by the most well known leaders organizations, such as ISO,
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Figure 13. DDN Model
2. SNA: Systems Network Architecture (SNA) was developed by
IBM as its major commitment to communications systems and
networks. It is a specification describing the architecture
for a distributed data processing network. It defines the
protocols and rules for the interaction of the components in
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the network. SNA also uses the layering concept, with the
disadvantage that the layer' s boundaries are not well
defined throughout all the SNA' s documentation. [Ref. 32: p.
290 - 291]
3. DNA: Digital Network Architecture (DNA) is the major data
communications network developed by Digital Equipment
Corporation. It was developed as a distributed network, and
uses a layering concept in its design. The goals of DNA
include providing resource-sharing capabilities, supporting
distributed computation, supporting a wide range of communi-
cations facilities, and creating a common user interface
across varied applications. [Ref. 32: p. 295]
4. DDN: Defense Data Network (DDN) , as shown in Figure 13,
is a packet switching network based on the ARPANET technolo-
gy. DDN has been designed to provide survivability, securi-
ty, and privacy. DDN is also a dynamic routing network, and
adjusts itself to any link or node failure without inter-
rupting the service for the subscribers. It has two major
functional areas: the backbone network, which consists of
the packet switches and the trunks between them; and the
access network that consists of the user access lines
connected to the backbone. DDN also provides extensive
monitoring of the system, and a secure traffic transmission,
with end-to-end encryption, if needed. [Ref. 32: p. 297 -
298]
Figure 14 depicts a comparison by layer of SNA, OSI,
and DNA models. Figure 15 shows the OSI layers, and a compari-
son between ISO, CCITT, and DOD protocols.
C. NETWORK LEVELS
The distribution of data is required for all levels of
command. The exchange of data between levels can be done
utilizing a single homogeneous network or a non-homogeneous
network of networks. The use of a single homogenous network is
virtually impossible due to the diversity of requirements that
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Figure 14. OSI, SNA, and DNA layers equivalences
The analysis of the data requirements, and how these data
are distributed between the command levels, is required to
design networks and their interfaces. These must be suitable
to satisfy requirements from the local user to the internet-
work information exchanges. In this analysis, it is possible
to identify three levels where the data distribution takes
place: [Ref. 33]
1. Cell: The data is generated and distributed locally
2. Area: The data distribution is done between cells.
3. Long-haul: It is the distribution of data between widely
dispersed units, and between tactical and strategic environ-
ment.
76
















* NO PROTOCOLS DEVELOPED FOR THESE LAYERS
Figure 15. Protocols Comparison
The design of these data distribution networks must be
oriented by the critical concept of information-knowledge
transformation. Only meaningful and useable information has to
be distributed over the networks, in opposition to today's
practice of transport and distribution of raw data.
1. LAN
The user may have local computer facilities in this
cell. When using these facilities, the users require transfer
of data capabilities among all the local users. A suitable
solution for these local data distribution requirements is
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given by the use of a Local Area Network (LAN) . [Ref . 33: p.
28]
The characteristics that define a LAN include:
[Ref. 34]
• It is operated in a limited geographic area.
• It uses a unique transmission technology.
• Its typical transmission capacity ranges from 1 Mbit/s to
20 Mbit/s.
• It is usually owned by the organization that uses the
facility.
Particularly of interest in LANs is the data link
layer of OSI model, which is divided into two sublayers:
• Logical Link Control (LLC) that is responsible for the
error and flow control, and
• Medium Access Control (MAC) that is responsible for the
access control to the transmission medium, and assures
that only one station transmits at a time.
2. WAN
The LANs that satisfy needs of local data transfer are
not suitable for distribution of data over long distances. The
units, locally served by LANs, are mobile and are usually dis-
persed over long distances. A suitable solution for long
distance data distribution is given by the Wide Area Network
(WAN) [Ref. 33: p. 28 - 29]. The communication means used at
this level to carried out the data transfer will usually be
radio distribution networks. Some of these radio networks
include those discussed in Chapter V, such as MSE, EPLRS,
SINCGARS, and JTIDS. WANs might be used to provide connection-
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between LANs and to interface with long-haul networks. [Ref.
33: p. 28]
3 . Long-Haul Networks
This type of network is designed to satisfy the needs
of passing information between widely dispersed units, or
between tactical and strategic environments. The communication
means for long-haul networks usually involves the use of
satellites or land line networks. [Ref. 33: p. 28 - 29]
D . INTERNETWORKING
The information generated locally could be needed at a
higher level. Since this information is reachable only by
long-haul networks, the networks must be connected. The need
for mobile networks, with high reliability and survivability,
can be achieved by the integration, directly and automatical-
ly, of all the communication resources available. However, the
internetwork concepts contain some very difficult technical
problems such as the utilization of different security devices
by the different networks, and the internetwork naming and
addressing in a dynamic environment.
It is possible to identify three key elements in the
integration of networks into a cohesive, multiple-security-
level internet: interfaces, packet switching technology




The interconnection of different networks can be
achieved by interfaces such as bridges or gateways through the





The bridge is the simplest of the internetworking
devices. It is used to interconnect LANs that use identical
protocols for layers 1 and 2 of the OSI model (Identical
Medium Access control (MAC) ) . The use of bridges to connect
different LANs instead of building a unique and long LAN
depend on several reasons: [Ref. 34]
• Improving reliability by partitioning a network into self-
contained units.
• Improving performance if devices can be grouped so that
intranetwork traffic significally exceeds internetwork
traffic.
• Enhancing security by adding control mechanisms, and by
grouping traffic, tasks, or devices that have different
security needs.
• Geographical conditions, if the grouped devices are
separated in different locations.
b Gateway-Router
A router is a general purpose device that can be
used to connect several types of networks. It relays packets
between heterogeneous networks at layer 3 of the OSI model
level. It has to solve the differences among networks in a
number of aspects, such as: [Ref. 34]
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• Network access protocol/interface
• Addressing scheme
• Unit of delivery
• User access control
These problems are solved by using Internet
Protocol (IP) implemented on top of the network layer, or
logical link control (LLC)
.
c. Gateway-Protocol Converter
This device is the most complex in an internet
working scheme. It translates protocols at OSI layer 4 and
higher. The gateway-protocol converters solve the problem of
interconnecting network architectures that are not compatible
with the OSI model protocols. These gateways provide a way to
permit the coexistence of OSI-based and non-OSI-base products.
They also allow the planning and implementation of a smooth
migration to an exclusive OSI strategy.
The use of this type of facility implies potential-
ly strong limitations in performance due to its bottleneck
potential. Overcoming this limitation involves a trade-off
between traffic efficiency and host software complexity by
incrementing the number of gateways used to interconnect the
networks. [Ref. 34]
2 . Packet Switching Technology
Computer networks are usually packet switched,
occasionally circuit switched, and rarely message switched.
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Internetworking of diverse users by using packet switching
technology should provide an acceptable alternative to the
current and costly point-to-point links.
Figure 16 shows the interconnection of different
networks with the layers, protocols, and gateways involved.
[Ref. 32: 496 - 597] [Ref. 34]































Figure 16. Internetworking scheme
In a packet-switched network, a message is broken down
into data units, called packets, that are delivered from node
to node in a store-and- forward manner. That means, at each
node, each packet is received, stored briefly in main memory,
and then forwarded to the next node, until it reaches the
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destination node, where the packets are rearranged, if they
arrived out of sequence.
Packet switching technology has several advantages
over circuit or message switched, such as: [Ref. 34]
• The limit in the amount of data in each packet speeds the
transmission, by reducing dramatically retransmission
delays at the intermediate nodes.
• It is more suited for interactive traffic.
• It allows the interconnection of dissimilar networks.
• It improves the line efficiency since each line can be
shared on a dynamic basis without dedicating resources to
any end user.
• It is possible to assign different priorities to packets
of messages, send the same packets of messages to many
destination, or reroute them in case of nodes failure.
Packet switching technology also provides an excellent
basis to integrate digitalized voice with other digital data
services into a common packet switched network, by the proper
design of the network interface and flow control protocols.
[Ref. 34] [Ref. 35]
3 . Multilevel Security Systems
A multilevel security system should have the capabili-
ty of integrating users operating at different security levels
into a common network for transmission. At the same time, the
system should allow users to isolate selected groups of users
operating at the same security levels from those not autho-
rized to operate at such levels. It must also assure the
security in an end-to-end basis by the encryption of the
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information prior to its insertion into the first network, and
then decryption only when the information arrives at its final
destination.
E. INTERNETWORKING IN THE U.S. ARMY
The three major Army systems, ACUS, ADDS, and CNRs, were
not engineered to be interoperable on an automatic basis. The
integration of these systems into a homogeneous network will
be the result of the efforts that are strongly supported by
the Army in order to achieve an efficient data distribution.
Achieving an integrated information network will require
the study, solution, and implementation of applications in
such issues as: [Ref. 26: p. 27]
• Providing high speed data distribution in the CNRs system.
• Automating gateways between tactical area systems and
strategic systems.
In September of 1989, an internet test bed demonstration
linking multiple existing and emerging tactical and strategic
packet-switched networks was performed. In the demonstration,
gateways and packet switches embedded in the current voice
circuit switches integrated the equipment of strategic
networks with the echelon-corps-and-below networks to provide
direct virtual circuits between computers . Selected MSE users
were also connected to the test network by using front end
communications security devices which could isolate them from
another unauthorized MSE users. The connection between
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SINCGARS network users and a MSE node in the division area was
achieved, allowing the SINCGARS user access to the test net-
work. [Ref . 36]
The Army envisions the achievement of an integrated data
network by upgrading existing architectures while providing
investments for advanced technology, that could include: [Ref.
26: p. 27]
• Full application of packet switching technology.
• Implementation of wireless digital distributed LANs.
F. SUMMARY
The network and network integration concepts were present-
ed in this chapter, and these concepts were differentiated
with respect to the communications concept. The international
standards and some non-standard, but already implemented,
network architectures were also described. Later in the
chapter, the different requirements and levels of data
distribution, and the types of networks that better fit each
of these levels were enumerated. The internetworking issue was
described through a general discussion and through the
description of its key elements.
As a final consideration, the integration of the three
major tactical networks of the U.S. Army was discussed as a
practical matter, and future trends in the evolution of
tactical networks were listed.
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VII. INTEROPERABILITY IN ARGENTINE ARMY SYSTEMS
A . BACKGROUND
1 . Introduction
The previous chapter presented and described informa-
tion systems, communication systems, and networks in a
tactical environment. The reader was provided with a discus-
sion of how these concepts are related to each other, and how
they might provide greater C 3 I systems integration. In this
chapter, these concepts will be linked with the C 3 I system of
the Argentine Army (AA)
.
Early computer applications were developed in the AA
without regard to system integration or interoperability. They
satisfied user needs only on a functional basis. In the 1970s,
the first attempt of integration was made by development and
partial implementation of an integrated information system,
known as SIIFE (Sistema Informatico Integrado de la Fuerza
Ejercito) . At the same time, a secure and independent system
for the intelligence area was also developed.
In the 1980s, the development of systems to complement
the partially implemented SIIFE were initiated in the logisti-
cal function from brigade to unit level. The AA also designed
and developed the first fire support system to support field
artillery units. Lately, the AA recognizes that the separation
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between information processing and information transferring is
becoming less distinct. The AA is integrating these two areas
under a unique command, and it is aware of the inherent high
risk that such reorganization implies. A failure in this
integration will almost guarantee that there will develop
isolated areas with scarce or no capabilities for efficient
exchange of information between them. In the last few years,
as C 3 concepts have been introduced to the current AA doc-
trine, the AA has carried out several analyses, planning
efforts, and actions with the objective of integrating the
existing and developing system into a modern C 3 I system. These
analyses include issues such as: [Ref. 4: p. 46]
• Satisfaction of operational requirements
• Joint development efforts
• Standardization and commonality
• Integrated logistic support planning
• Transition to extensive, common, secure, digital communi-
cations
• Mobility of equipment
• Intra/interoperability
The initial step is being taken presently, by defining
an initial architecture for the C 3 I system, as well as the




2 . Initial Architecture
Figure 17 depicts a probable initial architecture for
the tactical C 3 I system of the AA, which resembles the nodal


























Figure 17. Initial Architecture of AA C 3 I System
The definition of an initial architecture were
proposed by the C3 Department of the Argentine Army Staff
after completion of two studies, the C3 System Study and the
C 3 Command Center Study. Both studies established the basic
operational requirements and main capabilities to be performed
by the future C 3 I system of the AA.




• Provide warning about enemy attacks and describe magnitude
and type.
• Provide permanent evaluation of the current situation of
own forces
.
• Collect information about the potential enemy threat in
order to formulate analysis and evaluation of the current
situation
.
• Assist planning support and decision making process.
• Transmit orders and control the mission execution.
• Coordinate actions in time and space.
• Protect and secure the stored and transmitted information.
The nodal control systems were proposed to establish
within each of the functional areas the managing, coordina-
ting, and processing of internal information while coordinat-
ing information flow with the other control elements.
To accomplish the data processing, the architecture
proposed that each node of the system should contain a data
processing center, which will be responsible for the adminis-
tration and distribution of data generated in its area of
interest. Gathering, correlating, selecting, and validating
data from different sources could be implemented through a
hierarchy of tactical fusion centers, which will provide an
optimum mix of the battlefield information to the whole
system.
To integrate the nodes and to carry the information
flow between nodes and to higher levels of command, the
architecture proposes an integrated communication system. This
system should provide voice-data communication and interface
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with the public communication systems. It should also provide
high mobility, interoperability, jam resistance, and distribu-
tion of data over the whole system.
The initial architecture provides the framework to
develop a C 3 I system, which will provide management, coordina-
tion, and mutual support. It will also reduce or eliminate the
typical node problem presented by the current single central-
ized system.
a. Information Systems
The architecture for the C 3 I system proposes to
associate an information system with each of the nodes, as
depicted in Figure 17. Some of the C3 I subsystems exist and
are evolving, others are in the design or definition phase.
The main characteristics of existing or under-definition
systems are: [Ref. 37]
• The Target Acquisition and Battlefield Surveillance
Subsystem (VICATAB) , which has the objective of acquiring
land targets, processing the data obtained by the sensors
in the data correlation centers and supporting the field
artillery units.
• The Air Surveillance, Air Threat Detection, Engagement of
Air Defense Artillery and Tactical Army Aviation Subsystem
(VIAER) , which has the objective of gathering, evaluating,
and presenting the information about enemy air activities,
evaluating threats, and assigning targets to fire units.
• The Information Processing and Decision Making Support
Subsystem (PROIN) , which has the objective of gathering,
evaluating, and presenting information about the status of
both own and enemy forces
.
• The logistic functions could be supported by SIIFE, that
can be easily expanded to satisfy logistics needs at any
level of command. Therefore, this system will require
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suitable interfaces to obtain interoperability with the
new systems under development.
Jb. Communication System and Networking
The reorganization that is facing the AA is
affecting, particularly, its communication systems. In
relation to the communications requirements of the C 3 I
systems, there is continuing analysis of the final communica-
tions architecture that will serve as backbone and support for
voice/data communications from the front line to the strategic
level. Therefore, the initial definition of the communication
system presented as basic requirement by the C 3 Department is
presented:
• The High Reliability and Survivability Communication
Subsystem (COMTAC) , which has the objective of offering
fast, secure, and continuous communication support to all
the operative units, as far as battalion and company
levels, and linking the tactical system with the national
and strategic communication system.
3 . Interoperability Challenge
Optimal C3 I integration will require certain tradeoffs
between C2 system design drivers and supporting systems
features and utilities. In developing of C 3 I system many
factors can be identified as requirements to achieve integra-
tion and interoperability. Some of these factors are doctrine,
operational techniques, hardware, planning, logistics support,
encryption algorithms, procedures, and training. In addition,
some technical parameters are also required, such as frequen-
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cies, terminal capabilities, application software, coding, and
protocols
.
A list of constraints in achieving interoperability in
the AA include: [Ref . 37]
• Poorly defined concepts, doctrine, and procedures for
joint operations
• Different phasing of system developments
• Independent service budget for development and procurement
of new systems
• Undefined standards for interfacing information systems
• Lack of methodology for system effectiveness evaluation
• Resistance to change by program managers
• Lack of trained personnel to manage the development and
integration of the new system
• Sunk cost investments in hardware and software
B. IMPROVING INTEROPERABILITY IN AA C3 I SYSTEM
The search for interoperability improvements in the AA C 3 I
system can not avoid addressing the issues analyzed in this
thesis, and some general, but no less important, issues that
are results of the new system requirements and the current
reorganization
.
Particular interoperability issues include the concept
addressed specifically in this thesis:
• Data processing and information systems
• Communications and networking
92
General interoperability issues to be considered in the
design and implementation of the C 3 I system include:
• Analysis of commercial components applicability
• Planning of personnel training and reeducation programs
1 . Data processing and Information Systems
In any of the existing or under development subsystems
of the AA C 3 system, the data processing requirements will be
increased enormously as they are fielded. In order to cope
with the new data flow that the new system will generate and
to accomplish the information system functions desired, the
development of integrated information systems, which will rely
on integrated communication systems, is a must.
The information systems associated with the defined
subsystem in the AA C3 I system should be designed to provide
the following:
• Exchange capabilities: word processing, electronic mail,
graphics processing, partitioned and replicated data base.




correlation, and spreadsheet models.
The DBMS will be the core of those systems, and it
should contain all the information that is available about the
forces in the area of interest, which include:
• Positional information indicating past and present
locations of forces.
• Historical data indicating the past intentions of forces
in the area of interest to provide decision support input
to staff personnel.
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• The rules of engagement as an analyst's decision support
aid.
• Terrain and weather data.
• Message traffic to update the other portions of the data
base as automatically as possible.
As important as the DMBS will be, the development of
a friendly application interface, which allows analysts to
track own and enemy forces in a near-real-time manner, must
support the decision making process.
The potential application of operations research and
artificial intelligence techniques (ES and DSS) , that were
addressed in Chapter IV, should be applied along all C 2
functions. These applications will facilitate the analysis of
data, their correlation, and concentration into information
and knowledge, providing expertise to the personnel in a short
period of time.
2 . Communications and Networking
Accomplishing C3 I system interoperability will require
the development of a strategic/tactical voice/data distribu-
tion program. It should provide a universal voice/data
distribution system, which will facilitate data integration of
subsystems (VICATAB, VIAER, SIIFE, and PROIN) and their
transport from the battlefield to national level. The communi-
cation and networking needs should be satisfied by using
systems ranging from civilian to military application. The
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definition and design of the current COMTAC subsystem could be
expanded to reach this comprehensive structure.
The adoption of open systems or internetwork architec-
tures, such as those represented by the ISO OSI model,
provides a guide for specification of technical standards,
interfaces, and internet gateways to be used in designing and
planning subsystems requiring interconnection to the C 3 I
system in a manner that can be implemented gradually using
evolutionary strategies.
In order to improve the AA C3 I system interoperability,
the following characteristics should be included in its
design:
• Development of distributed systems based in the modularity
concept. The degree of distribution will dependent on the
operational situation.
• System capability of rapidly adapting to changes in the
environment. This characteristic will allow the system to
sense the environment and alter its configuration to
ensure continuity in the operations.
• Because security issues are an important impediment for
interoperability, security problems must be solved before
interoperability goals can be met.
Artificial intelligence techniques are envisioned effecti-
vely to plan and manage multiple, interconnected, and tactical
communication media. The applications of artificial intelli-
gence could include control routing, allocation of channel
capacity, dynamic rerouting, and network reconfiguration.
The design of the such data distribution system could
include:
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a. Brigade and below Levels
At brigade headquarters and unit levels, the
adoption of a single standardized LAN technology appears as a
suitable solution to satisfy the user needs. LANs will
facilitate the transition and transportability of the new
system. According to the experience of the United States
Marines Corp (USMC) , in Operation Desert Shield/Storm,
Ethernet LANs using coaxial cable have proved to be more
reliable and robust in the field than twisted-pair wiring
[Ref . 38]
.
Jb. Operational Theater Level
A solution for operational theater level could be
the implementation of WANs by interconnecting LANs using
multiple transmission media. These media could be dial-up
telephone lines and high-frequency tactical radio. At this
level, the communication links should include the national
data/voice communication networks, where available, that will




The interconnection of the WANs by national long-
haul networks will provide to the strategic level on-time and
accurate information from the battlefield. They will be the
packet switching backbone network, which will provide a high
level of modular nodes with increase in traffic volume, secure
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routing, and high priority data transmission. It will also
provide a CCITT X.25 standard to support different protocols
on an optional basis.
d. Mobile Communication System
The COMTAC subsystem should consider the advantages
of developing an integrated mobile, secure voice, data and
record communication system. The development of such a
subsystem into COMTAC should be based in wireless communica-
tions using digital cellular technology, spread-spectrum
techniques, and TDMA/CDMA multiplexing and access techniques.
e. Position Location System
PROIN subsystem will require tracking the position
of friendly and enemy forces. A complex system like EPLRS
would require huge investments for its acquisition and
maintainability, in case the system were available for foreign
non-NATO armed forces. The implementation of a cheaper
solution could be the use of Global Position System (GPS)
terminals, when they are available by bilateral agreement or
public release, in combination with radio systems and tactical
data distribution systems. These systems could be used to pass
the position information from the front line through all
levels of command.
3 . Personnel training
The reorganization of the communication and informa-
tion processing areas will imply a tremendous challenge for
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the AA. It should include a whole training program and a
reeducation of the personnel from middle management through
senior management positions. These training programs will not
affect the personnel work environment, but they could affect
the balance between the military and the civilian work force
market. The military personnel will become, after the train-
ing, communication-information specialists, that have few
counterparts in the private sector. The ways the specialists
could be retained in the military should be assessed before
any implementation take place. In the area of tactical
systems, it is important that the developing and future
systems will include the requirement of no dedicated operators
by using well-designed user interfaces. These characteristics
will allow the users of the systems to be fully trained to use
the system in a relative short time period.
4 . Commercial Components Applicability
Since the AA budget is restricted and because of the
nearly parallel evolution of military and commercial require-
ments for computer and communications components, the imple-
mentation of the C3I system in the AA could be done by using
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software products
as components of its subsystems. Most of the COTS are suffi-
ciently ruggedized to meet military requirements, and only a
few products should have to modify their commercial standards.
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C. SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly introduced the origin and current
status of the C 3 I system of the AA. The description of its
subsystems was also presented. Later, the issues that could
affect the achievement of interoperability in the AA C 3 I
system were addressed. Finally, alternative bases for the
improvement of the subsystems were discussed.
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VI 1 1 . CONCLUS IONS
In spite of changing technology, the functions of C 3 I
systems will remain the same. For many years, the AA has been
capable of maintaining extensive unprocessed data links with
their units and has not used the current technology to modify
C 2 functions. The improvement in communications, networking,
and data processing will bring in the future a larger amount
of data from old and new sources, but this data must be edited
and transformed into information and/or knowledge before
reaching the staff work table.
Accomplishing these tasks will require the design,
development, and implementation of a C 3 I system, which is an
ambitious enterprise. This thesis has been written with the
objective of helping the Argentine Army in its efforts to
furnish its C 3 I system with as much interoperability as
possible. The particular constraints and restrictions lead to
the recognition that it will be necessary to adapt the ideas,
concepts, tools, and techniques presented by this thesis to
the reality faced by the AA today.
The ideas, models, tools, and techniques introduced in
this thesis, along with the integration of the C 3 concepts
into the doctrine of the AA, could provide a source of
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technological update, helping the AA to maintain its opera-
tional capabilities in the near future.
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